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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE K. THo~rPsox nnd FR--\:XK
S . .JI .-\ R K H A ::-.r, copartnership
doing· business under the firn1
nam~ and st-:le of THO::\IPSON.JL-\RKH.DI co:\IP.-\XY.

Plain tiffs,
YS.

THE IxDl"STRL'I.L Co:'.Dnssro~ OF
UTAH, \Y ILLIAM :JI. l(XERR,
Chairman and rnember of said
The Industrial Connnission of
Utah, and 0. F. 1IcSHA:XE and
FRAXK A. JrGLER, members of
said The Industrial Conunission of Utah, and E. A. HoDGES)
State ~Ietal :Mine Inspector,
Defendants.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE K. THOMPsox and FRANK
S. ~I ARK HAM, copartnership
doing business under the finn
name and stvle of THOMPSON_jb.RKHAM CO:\lPAXY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE IxnesTRIAL CoMMrssrox OF
UTAH, WILLIAM ~I. KNERR,
Chairman and member of said
The Industrial Commissi·on of
Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and
FRANK A. J UGLER, members of
said The Industrial Commission of Utah, and E. A. HoDGES,
State ~fetal ~fine Inspector,
Defendants. /

BRIEF OF AMICUS

No. 62.21

CURl~

The undersigned as attorneys for the Associated
General Contractors petitioned to be allowed to appear
as amicus curire in the above matter by reason of the
fact that the principles and questions of law presented
for determination will vitally affect members of the
Associated General Contractors in the submitting of
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bids upon and prosecution of projects involving underground excavations unrelated to mining; and by rea:son
of the further fact that the determination of such questions .substantially affects the construction industry generally and the employees thereof who may be called
, upon, in the prosecution rOf :projects unrelated to mining
to be engaged in the making of excavations. Permission having been granted to appear in that capacity,
counsel will attempt as far as possible to avoid repeating
the matters and things already presented in t·he briefs of
plaintiffs and defendants already on file.
The powers of the Industrial Con1mission are set
forth in Section 42-1-16 of the Revised Statute's. So
far as this case is concerned the Commission has jurisdiction and authority to enforce all laws for the protection o.f the life, health, safety, :protection, and welfare
of employees. In addition it has jurisdiction to extend,
fix, prescribe, modify and enforce reasonable orders
relating to the protection of life, health, safety and welfare of employees. Under the,latter power the statute
prescribes the pr·ocedure to be followed, namely, investigation, order by the Commission, time and place for
hearing, etc. It is not contended in the case at bar that
the Commission is attempting to exercise jurisdiction
under that authority. Under the provisions of paragraphs IX and XII of the :petition and IX and XII o.f
the answer it is alleged and admitted that the attempted
jurisdiction of defendants arises by reason of the first
enumerated portion of the statute, namely, to enforce
this particular law as against petitioner.
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~\n attempt to enforce a law as against individuals
not subject to the law is a jurisdictional questi·on such
as to give right to resort to one of the extraordinary
remedies sought in this ease.

See State L\ Padavich decided by the Supreme Court
of Iowa in 1937, 27-! X. \Y. 51, where the state mine inspector atten1pted to enforce certain pr-ovisions of the
mining code with reference to the protection of employees against the owner of a n1ine, working therein
as owner-not employee.
The only question, therefore, for determination in
the case is as to whether the provisions of Section 49-3-2
of the Re,·ised Statutes of Utah 1933, as amended by
Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1937, apply to employers and
employees engaged in excavation work unrelated to
mining, although in s·ome particulars similar in character.
Counsel for petitioners assert in their brief that
this statute is penal in character and should be strictly
construed. On the other hand, counsel for defendants
insist that under the provisions ·Of Section 103-1-2 of
the penal code of our Revised Statutes the 0o·mmon law
rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has
no applicability, and that all statutes are to be construed
according to the ''fair import of their terms''. In
addition to the authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff'·s upon this particular subject matter, we respectfully
call the court's attention to the fact that in the case of
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pressly held the statute in question to he penal in character.
Our Section 103-1-2 to ~hich counsel for defendants
makes reference was taken from and is word for word the
same as one from California. Section 179, Volume 23
California Jurisprudence, page 802, states as follows with
reference to the extent to which this provision of our statute affects the common law rule of statutory construction:
''Sec. 17~). Penal Statutes.-At common law
penal statutes are strictly 0onstrued, and all
doubts are resolved in favor of the person sought
to be subjected thereto. But this rule has no
application to the Penal Code, and it has been
held that a penal provision, whether contained
in one of the 0odes or not, should receive such
construction as will comport with the fair import
of its terms, with a view to effect their objects and
to promote justice. Nevertheless, courts are not
authorized to build up crimes 'with the aid of
inference, implication and strained interpretation.' Nor may they impose penalties where the
law is silent. On the contrary, it is clear that no
one may be made subject to a penal statute by·
implication, and that such a statute may not, under
any rule of construction, be so read as to reach
further than its wo·rds. If the consequences of a
penal provision are confined to a specified class
of cases, other cases not mentioned are excluded;
and where any particular article of property is
mentioned as the subject of an offense, only such
property as is usually designated by such term
may be regarded as embraced within its provisions.''
Numer·ous cases are cited to support this statement.
Assuming, however, that under the provisions of our
statute as cited by counsel for defendants, penal statutes
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are to be construed according to the fair import of their
terms, we nevertheless respectfully subn1it that statutes
of this char~cter are not to be extended by judicial
interpretation beyond the fair import of their terms or
meaning, and that a consideration of this statute, coupled
with its legislatiYe and judicial history, shows that the
"fair import of its tern1s" amply manifests the intention
of the legislature to confine the statute in applicability
to mines and smelters.
Determining the ''fair import'' of a statute simply
means an effort t·o find out what the legislature intended
the statute to cover. It is no part of the business of the
judicial branch and no function of the executive department to write new legislation. T·hat function is to be
exercised exclusiYely by the legislature.
Counsel for plaintiffs have set forth the legislative
and judicial hist·ory of this enactment from its earliest
inception. Counsel for defendants, on the other hand,
criticize this historical record to the following effect:
First, that the titles" A DAY'S \YOR.K-MINES AND
S:\lELTERS '' \Yas not in. the act but was inserted by
the engrossing clerks or by the printers; and second,
that the statements used by the Supreme Court of Utah
and the Supreme Court ·of the United States in the
cases of State v. Holden and Holden v. Flardy were
dicta.
\Ye respectfully submit that counsel for defendants
are in error in both particulars.
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STATE V. HOLDEN AND HOLDEN V. HARDY.
The two Holden cases, 14 Utah 71 and 14 Utah 96,
were decided i~ October and November, 1896, respectively. The Constitution of our State was adopted N,ov.
5, 1895 and this law was originally passed in 1896. \Yhile
the Holden cases, a.s stated by counsel for defendants,
involved conviction for violation of the Statute by working a man longer than eight hours in a concentrating
n1ill and in an underground mine respectively, it is not
altogether true, as stated by counsel for defendants,
that "there was no question as to whether the act applied
to underground work other than miners, and this court,
in either case, did not mention the subject", as stated
on page six of their brief. The constitutionality of this
statute was raised upon the ground that it contravened
other provisions of the Constitution of Utah and provisions of the Constitution of the United States. It was
alleged that there were other provisions in the Constitution of the State of Utah and United States guaranteeing to individuals the free right to make contracts,
particularly with reference to one's services; that the
eight hour provisions of the Constitution related entirely
to work or undertakings carried on or aided by the state,
county, or municipal go;vernments; and that the provision in the Constitution for the legislature to pass laws
to provide for the healt1h and safety of laborers in factories, smelters and mines was .a separate and distinct provisio'n from the

fir~t

portion of the paragraph stating that

eight hours should constitute a

da~· 's

\York on public pro-
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jects. It therefore ,,~as a dec:isiYe question in the cases
whether the eight hour statute was passed under t1he general provision to pass laws to provide for the health and
safety of employees in mines; whether the eight hour
provision applied to mines because of the fact that mining is vested with a public interest; whether the legislation was passed lmder the general welfare clause;
whether an eight hour provision was a health or safety
measure if passed pursuant to the last portion of Section
6; and if attempted to be passed under the general
welfare clause whether it would be unconstitutional
because both the Constitution of the State of Utah and
the Constitution of the United States expressly limited
the right .of the state legislature to pass regulatory laws
upon business not affected with a public interest.
A reading of the first Holden case shows that all of
these constitutional questions were propounded and decided. It was therefore necessary for the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah and also for the Supreme Court
of the United States to determine first and foremost
the source ·o.f constitutional authority for the enactment.
That, we respectfully submit, is the reason why those
courts considered the applicability of the law to other
industries. The eight hour provision expressly applied
only to works or undertakings carried on or aided by
the state, 0ounty, or municipal governments. That was
a general application-not limited to any activity. The
general welfare clause is not limited to any particular
activity excepting that the enterprise regulated or the
particular ·employees affected must affect the general
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public. On the other hand the provision of the Constitution that the legislature shall pass laws to provide for
the health and safety .of employees of factories, smelters
and mines was limited to that particular class of industries or activities. If, therefore, the legislation was
passed pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution to
provide by legislation for the health and safety of mine
and smelter emp1oyees, then the legislation was limited
to and to be interpreted by that intent.
With this understanding of the questions presented
for consideration we submit that the decisions involved
wherein the particular act in question was tied definitely
and finally to the constitutional power given the legislature to legislate for the health and safety of emp1o,yees
in smelters and mines becomes conclusive and binding
in view of subsequent history, as to the intent of the
legislature in enacting it.
That our understanding of the Holden case is correct is manifest from the statements of the court as to
the basis f.or its decision.
In the first Holden case, 14 Utah 71, this court had
the following to say:
''The first clause of section 6 declares that 'eight
hours shall constitute a day's work on all works
or undertakings carried on or aided by the state,
county or municipal government.' We presume
the object of this provision was to protect the
laboring man fro,m the injurious consequences of
prolonged physical effort, and to give him the
remainder of the 24 hours for his own personal
affairs, and for the cultivation of his mental and
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moral powers, the acquisition of useful knowledge,
and for rest and sleep. The second clause of the
section conunands the legislature to pass laws
'for the health and safety of employes in factories, smelters and mines.' This provision must
be regarded as an expression of the will of the
people of the state with respect to the subjects
and objects of legislation named in it; and they
possessed all the power to enact laws with respect
to such subjects that the people of the United
States had not conferred in the national constitution exclusively on that government. Any law
adapted to the preservation of the health or safety
.of employes vn. factories, smelters, or mines is
within the seope of this pr·ovision. The law must
be connected with some of the objects named, and
calculated to effect that purpose. If it is not so
connected and adapted, the court has the right to
hold that it is not within the scope of the provision. * * *
''This brings us to the question: Is the first
section of the statute limiting the period of employment of laboring men in underground mines
to eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent
danger, calculated to protect the health of such
laboring men~ * * * We cannot say that this
law, limiting the period of labor in underground
mines to eight hours each day, is not calculated
to promote health; that it is not adapted to the
protection of the health of the class of men who
work in underground mines.
''While the provision of the oonsti tution
under consideration makes it the duty of the legislature to enact laws to protect the health and
to secure the safety of men working in underground mines, and in factories and smelters, it
does not prohibit the legislature from enacting
other laws affecting such classes, to promote the
general welfare. * * * On the other hand,
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while the state constitution contains some mandatory provisions, with others, distinguishing the
departments of the government, and specifying
the duties of various officers thereof, it contains
many limitations upon the state, and is regarded
in a general sense as a limitation upon the state
government. * * * The enactment of some
laws is made mandatory. The enactment of
others is left to the discretion of the legislature,
as the public welfare may demand. Among the
mandatory provisions of the constitution of this
state is the one under consideration. * * *
."But some pursuits are attended with peculiar
hazards and perils, the injurious consequences
from which may be largely prevented by precauti·onary means, and laws may be passed calculated
to protect the classes of people engaged in such
pursuits. It is not necessary to extend the protection to persons engaged in other pursuits not
attended with similar dangers. To them the law
would be inappropriate and idle. So, if wnderground mining is attended wit1h dangers pe·culiar
to it, laws adapted to the protection of such
miners from such danger should be confined to
that class of mining, and should not include other
employments not subject to them. And if men
engaged in underground mining are liable to be
injured in their health, or otherwise, by too many
hours' labor each day, a law to protect them
should he aimed at that peculiar wrong. In this
way, laws are enacted to protect people from
perils from the operation of railroads, by requiring bells to he rung and whistles sounded at road
·Crossings, and the slacking of the speed of the
trains in cities. 8o, the sale of liquor is regulated
to lessen the evils of the liquor traffic, and other
classes of business are regulated by appropriate
laws. In this way, laws are designed and adapted
to the peculiarities attending each class of business. By such laws, different classes.
people

o£
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are protected by Yarious arts and provisions. In
this way, Yarious classes o.f business are regulated, and the people protected, by appropriate
laws. fron1 dangers and evils that beset them;
safety is secured, health preserved, and the happiness and welfare of humanity promoted. All
persons engaged in business that may be attended
with peculiar injury to health or otherwise, if not
regulated and controlled, should be subject to
the same law; ·otherwise, the law should be
adapted to the special eircmnstances. T·he purpose of such laws is not adYantage to any person
or class of .persons, or disadvantage to any person or class of persons. Necessary and just
protection is the s·ole object. * * *
''The section of the statute whose constitutionality is involved in this case includes all employees and employers engaged in working underground mines. None are omitted who may be
subject to the peculiar conditi·ons that attend such
mining. The provision of the state constitution
quoted makes it the duty of the legislature to
·pass la1cs to provide for the health alf'lrd safety
of employes i·ll factories, smelters :and mrines.'
And we are not authorized to hold that the law
in question is not calculated and adapted in any
degree to promote the health and safety of persons working in mines and smelters. Were we
to do so, and declare it void, we would usurp the
.powers intrusted by the constitution to the lawmaking power. The discharge of the petitioner
is denied, and he is remanded to the custody of
the sheriff named, until discharged according to
la\\'."
and in the second Holden case, 14 Utah 96:
"The people of the state, in their constitution, made it mandato·ry upon the legislature to
'pass laws to provide for the health and safety
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of the employes in factories, smelters and mines.'
Const. Utah, Art. 16, sec. 6. \Y e do not feel authorized to hold that the statute quoted was not
designed, calculate·d, and adapted to promote the
health of the class of 1nen who labor in smelters
and other works for the reduction and treatment
of ores. * * * The law in question is confined
to the protection of that class of people engaged
in labor in underground mines, and in smelters
and otlwr works wherein ores are reduced and
refi;ned. This law applies only to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending underground mining
and work in smelters, and other works for the
reduction and refining of ores. Therefore, it is
not necessary to discuss or decide whether the
legislature can fix the hours of labor in other
employments.''
In the case of Holden v. Hardy in the Supreme
Oourt of the United States, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780,
the only question involved was as to whether the enactment in question contravened the Constitution of the
United States. It was no part of the function of that
court t·o determine the source of legislative power so far
as the Constitution of the State of Utah was concerned.
That question had already been decided by the Supreme
.Court of the State of Utah as arising from the constitutional mandate· to the legislature to pass laws to provide f.o-r the health and safety of employees in smelters
and n1ines. The Supreme Court of the United States
sustained the constitutionality of the law upon the broad
ground that the State legislature by its enactment bad
·:decreed that laborers engaged in working in under,' :ground mines were entitled to special protection on
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account of the extra·o·rdinary hazards involved in that
occupation. In determining its constitutionality upon
that ground the court said as follows:
"\Vbile the business of mining coal and manufacturing iron began in Pennsylvania as early
as 1716, and in \ Tirginia, North Carolina, and
:Jiassachusetts even earlier than this, both mining
and rnanufacturing "-ere carried on in such a
limited \Yay and by such primitive methods that
no special laws were considered necessary, prior
to the adoption of the Constitution, for the protection of the operatives, but, in the vast proportions which these industries have since assumed,
it has been found that they can no longer be carried on with due regard to the safety and health
of those engaged in then1, without special protection against the dangers necessarily incident to
these employn1ents. I'll consequence of this, laws
have been enacted in most of the states designed
to meet these exigencies and to ·secure the safety
of persons perculiarly exposed to these dangers.
\\'ithin this general category are .ordinances providing for fire escapes for hotels, theatres, factories, and other large buildings, a municipal inspection of boilers, and appliances designed to
secure passengers upon railways and steamboats
against dangers necessarily incident to these
methods of transportation. In states where manufacturing is carried on to a large extent, provision is made for the .protection of dangerous
machinery against accidental co:q.tact, for ·the
cleanliness and ventilation of working rooms, for
the guarding of well holes, stairways, elevator
shafts, and for the employment of sanitary appliances. In others, where mining is the principal
industry, special provision is made for the shoring up of dangerous walls, f()r ventilation shafts,
bore holes, escapement shafts, ·means of signaling
the surface, for the supply of fresh air and the
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elimination, as far as possible, of dangerous
gases, for safe means of hoisting and lowering
cages, for a limitation upon the nu1nber of persons permitted to enter a cage, that cages shall
ibe covered, and that there shall be fences and
gates around the top of shafts, besides other
similar precautions. * * *
''Upon the princip1es above ~tated, we think
the act in question may be sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. The
enactment does not profess to limit the hours of
all workmen, but merely those who are employed
in wndergro'Uind mines, or in the smelting, reduction, or refining of ores or metals. * * *
''The law in question is confined to the protection
of that class of people engaged in labor in undergrownd mines, and in smelters and other works
wherein ores are reduced and refined. The law
applies only to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects
attending wndergrou.nd mining and work in smelters, and .other works for the reduction and refining of ores. Therefore, it is not necessary to
discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix
the hours of labor in other employments. * * *

"We have no disposition to criticize the many
authorities which hold that state statutes restricting the hours of labor are unconstitutional. Indeed, we are not called upon to express an opinion
upon this subject. It is sufficient to say of them
that they have no application to cases where the
legislature had adjudged that a limitation is
necessary for the preservation of the health of
employees, and there are reas·onable grounds for
believing that sueh determination is supported by
the facts. The question in each case is whether
the legislature has adopted the statute in exercise
of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action
be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination,
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or the oppression, or spoliation of a particular
class.''
Thus we see that in all three of these cases the
scope, purview and applicability of the statute was
necessarily involved in determining its constitutionality.
The fact that it was limited in scope to employees engaged in the mining industry made it constitutional so
far as the State -of Utah was concerned because it was
within the express provisions of a mandate in the consiitution to enact laws for the safety and health of men
engaged in the mining industry. The fact that it was
limited in scope to employees in the mining industry
made it constitutional so far as the Constitution of the
United States was 0oncerned, because the legislature
declared persons engaged in laboring in underground
mines to be subject to peculiar hazards incident to that
employment. The case of Holden v. Hardy was decided
February 28, 1898.
This law as passed by the legislature of Utah immediately following adoption of the Constitution and
was known as Chapter 72 and was entitled, "An .Act
Regulating the Hours of Employment in Undergrownd
Mines and in Smelters and/ or Reduction W arks."

It was re-enacted as part of the Revised Statutes
of Utah 1898 in consolidated form but with the same
wording and under the heading "Labor", "In Mines and
Smelters", and has been carried under that heading with
the same wording to the present time, excepting that in
1937 the collar to- collar feature was inserted.
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The legislature of 1933 in adopting and authorizing
the Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 reviewed all past
legislative enactments, revised them and authorized their
publication as a volume to be known as the Revised
Statutes ·of Utah 19 33, and as a part of that procedure
passed Ohapter 76 of the Laws of Utah 1933, as follows:
1

''The statute book containing the text of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, certified to the
secretary of state by the president of the senate
and the speaker of the house of representatives
by authority and direction .of this session of the
legislature is approved, adopted and legalized as
to arrangement of said text by title, chapter,
article and section for the purpose of amendment
or repeal of said text in whole or in part by reference thereto.''
See also Chapters 74 and 75. Within that statute
book so adopted and legalized by the legislature of 1933
was the heading ''In Mines and Smelters'', as a portion
of the caption for Section 49-3-2, the provision in question. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the legislature in 1933 not only adopted the exact wording of
the law which had already been construed by the
Supreme Oourt of this State and the Supreme Court
of the United States, but also officially adopted and
made a part of the statutes of this State the heading
''In Mines and Smelters'' as defining, construing and
limiting the applicability of this statute.
In 1896 when this statute was first passed H contained three sections. Section 1 contained the same
wording as that embodied in the present statute, but
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there was a separate section 2 pertaining to employees
in smelters and other institutions for the reduction or
refining of ores or Inetals. In 1898 this statute was reenaeted by the legislature of Utah with the same wording
so far as applies to this case, but wherein the various
sedions were consolidated into the present statute. This
re-enachuent by adoption of the same language was after
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in the various Holden cases
had decreed the statute to be limited to employees in the
mining and smelting industry in determining its constitutionality.
\\1lere statutes are re-enacted, as was done by the
legislature of Utah in 1898, and was undoubtedly done
in 1907 and 1917 in adopting and legalizing the Compiled
Laws {)f those years, with their headings, and as was
actually done in 1933 by adopting the Revised Statutes
of Utah 1933, including its title, we respectfully submit
that the legislature is presumed to have adopted the
interpretation given it by the courts.
See the following:

Roberts, 56 Utah 136, 190 Pac. 351,
cited with approval in Tintic Standard
Jlining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah
491, 13 Pac. (2d) 633, 637;
Latimer v. U. 8.,
223 U. S. 501, 56 L. Ed. 326,
/)'tate u.

where the court said :
''The words having received such a construction
under the act of 1883, must be given the same
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meaning when used in the tariff act of 1897, on
the theory that, in using the phrase in the later
statute, Congress adopted the construction already given it by this court."
And hundreds of cases collected in America•n Digest
under ''Statutes,'' Key No. 22·53;4, and also
State v. Chea.lander, et al., 131 Wash. 145, 229 Pac.
309, holding that where a legislature meets after a
statute has been construed by the court without taking
any steps to amend the statute that it will he presumed
that the legislature has acquiesced in the construction
of the statute made by the court.
We also respectfully submit that if there were any
ambiguity ·Or uncertainty as to the meaning of this
statute that this court is justified in looking to the heading of the statute and t·he source of constitutional power
from which it sprang in determining the meaning and
intent of the statute, and the intent of the legislature
as to the particular class of individuals to be affected
by it, in arriving at the ''fair import'' ·of the terms
used by the legislature.
J( at.z 1.-..

U. S., 271 U. S. 354, 70 L. Ed. 986;

Goodcell v.

Grahan~,

35 Fed. (2d) 586;

Southlands Co. v. City of San Diego,
211 Cal. 646, 297 Pac. 521;
.:..llcNamara v. State,
203 Ind. 596, 181 N. E. 512;
Siegel v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.,
201 Iowa 712, 208 X. W. 78;
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Jrheelright, ct al. r. Refray,
~~-35 ~lass ..)8-l-. 1~7 ~- E.

5~:3;

State v. Vo'lcels, 4 Ore. 324:
Olson u. Erickson,

56 X. D. 468, 217

~-

\r. 841.

The word "working" as u.sed in the· statute in question when used in connection with mining is a synonym
for the underground portion of a mine. According to
lexicographers it may have a n1eaning beyond mining,
but it has acquired a peculiar significance and applicability to mining. Among mining men and in mining
communities the word "working" ·D-r "workings'' refer·s
to the portion of the mine where mining or excavating
is done as distinguished from the dump, buildings and
operations on the surface. It is a word of common usage
and is well understood.
A Glossary of ~lining and Milling Industry by
Albert H. Fay is contained in Bulletin No. 95 of the
Enited States Bureau of :Mines. In it the word "working" is defined as a. shaft, quarry, level, open cut or
stope, and as ''a name given to the whole strata excavated in working a seam". The word "workings" is
defined as ''any species of development; usually refers
to the breasts in contradistinction to all underground
excavations''.
"\Vhile, as before stated, technically speaking, the
word might have broader application as referring to any
place in which work is being carried on, we submit that
in this statute, enacted for the protection and safeguard
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of the health of employees in mines, it was used as a
nlining term and as a simile for underground mining.
In the case of McLaughlin v. Bardsen, (:Jiont.) 145
Pac. 954, a woman fell into a sewer trench being excavated within the city of Butte. There was a state statute
with reference to protecting "sinks'', "shafts'' or any
''drift'' or ''cut'' within the limits of any city or town
or village of the state. The particular statute in question was a part .of the statute under the heading "Mines
and Prospectors''. It was contended that the statute
had applicability to sewer trenches because a sewer
trench was a "cut". In refusing applicability of the
statute to the case the Montana Supreme Court used the
following language:
"This statute was first enacted in 1871 (Codified Stat. 1871, p. 593), and "·ith very slight
amendments has been brought forward to the
present time. The arrangement and classification
of statutes, their title and headnotes, are all
proper and available means from which to determine legislative intent.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
''In every one of the acts above mentioned,
the only things prohibited are sinking a shaft or
running a drift or cut. \\Then the statute was
first enacted, each of these tenns had, and ever
since has had, a well-defined and generall~· understood meaning. Each referred to an ;operatio·n
in mining, and to nothing else; at all times
each has been a strictly mining term. In its br·oad
significance, the word 'cut' 1nay have a meaning
other than that employed in mining; but when
used in conjunction "·ith 'shaft' and 'drift' it
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:?l
1ueans a surface opening in the ground intersecting- a Yein. · Copulatio Yerborum indicat acceptationein in eodem sensu.' Our conclusion, from
the history of secti·on 8535 and the prohibitive
languag-e employed, is that it was never intended
to apply to a ditch or trench ten1porarily opened
for the purpose of laying sewer pipe.''
There \Yas also a Butte city ordinance involved
which was even broa·der t1han the state statute because it
included also the phrase "or other excavation". Plaintiff also relied upon a violation of that ordinance as a
ground of liability, but the Supreme Court of Montana
refused to permit the ordinance to ·be so construed, and
said as follows:
"It is very clear that the sewer trench in
question cannot be classified as a 'shaft,' 'drift,'
or 'prospect hole.' Each of those terms has a
well-defined and generally understood meaning
in this state, and particularly in Butte, where
mining is the principal industry. But it is insisted that the terms 'or other excavation' are
sufficiently broad to include the trench in question.
If the prohibition of the ordinance was directed
against any excavation being left unguarded, appellant's contention would prevail. But since
t1he words ·or other excavation' follow immediately after the specific enumeration 'shafts,'
'drifts,' 'prospect holes,' the rule of statutory
construction exemplified by the expression
'ejusden1 generis,' or 'noscitur a so cis,' requires
the word 'excavation' to be employed to mean
some other opening in the ground of the same
class of shafts, drifts, and prospect holes. As
applied to the ordinance in question, the rule
requires the conclusion that it was the intenti·on
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of the city council of Butte to use the terms 'other
excavation' as meaning, and to refer to, some
other excavation made in the course of prospecting or active mining.''
So in the case at bar the word "working" might be
lifted from its setting and be given broader applicability
than was given it in the Holden cases, but we respectfully submit that when considered in connection with its
0onstitutional, legislative, statutory and judicial history,
and when considered as a part of a statute enacted to
provide for the health and safety of miners, it should
be construed .as a simile of underground mining, as
was intended.
This statute ,,·as conceived in the constitution of
our state with a mandate to the legislature to enact
laws f.or the protection, safety, and health of miners.
It was born in 1896 in an act entitled "An Act Regulating the Hours of Employment in Underground Mines
and in Smelters and Ore Reduction Works.'' For fortyfour years, through various revisions, codifications, reenactments ~and compilations it has gone under the name
''Hours of Labor-Mines and Smelters". It is inseparably connected with the mining industry, and during
those forty-four years it never sought applicability outside of or beyond that industry. In 1937, however, it
received attention fr.onl the legislatun~, not to change its
characteristics but to shorten the hours of employment
in that industry.

This collar to collar attachment

changed no part of the costume nor character of the
statute but permitted the miner to go from and return
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to the collar of the shaft on c01npany time. \rho would
have thought that this collar to collar amendment could
so change the old statute as to oo·mpletely wipe away the
forty-four years history and, like a quick-change artist,
turn the miner into ·a general contractor 1 When we look
at the situation we find that the attempted change is
not made by the constitutio~al mother nor the legislative father, both of whom established its characteristics
and accepted its limitations as established in the Holden
cases ·and as classified in all legislative codes, compilations and headings. The executive branch of the Government is the one which would sweep aside this legislative
and judicial ·history and extend the statute to activities
unrelated to mining.
But, say counsel for defendants, the operations in
digging a tunnel such as plaintiffs are constructing are
similar to mining and the statute should be held as applying to all operations similar to mining. On page 14 of
their brief they state, ''this court will take judicial
notice that we have in this state numerous long tunnels
which were driven f.or purposes other than mining,
namely, the Ontario drain tunnel, the Snake Creek drain
tunnel, Tintic drain tunnel, and the Elton Tunnel". They
also state that "prospects" are not mines because they
may not encounter ore in paying quantities. They argue
at length that in these other operations miners are used,
the air is damp and polluted with powder smoke and
other gases, the miners contract consumption or silicosis,
and that it makes no difference whether the tunnel is
being driven for the purpose of finding ore or for the
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purpose of conveying water. Counsel state that when
the legislature used the words "or underground works"
that it intended to cover all of these operations similar
to mining. Of course the legislature used no such language. The wording is ''all underground mines or
workings'', not ''or undergr.ound works''.
It is true that in some respects these operations are
similar. Counsel are in error when they assume that a
"prospect" is not a mine, because the authorities are
replete with cases to the effect that they are. When
individuals burrow in the earth's surface for the purpose
of either searching for or removing minerals, they are
engaged in mining, and the "working" or "workings"
where they ·operate is a mine. United States patents
are obtained as mineral ground upon showing of the
existence of a vein, fissure, or lode, without regard to· its
commercial character. A tunnel used in connection with
a mine is part of a mine where it is used for transportation purposes or for drainage purposes. This court
in the case of Ontario Silver Mining Company v. Hixon,
49 Utah 359, 164 P.ac. 49-8, decided that the Ontario Drain
Tunnel, although used for drainage purposes only, was
an inseparable part of the mine for taxation purposes
because said tunnel '''as used in furtherance of a mining
purpose. The drainage was merely incidental to the
mining.

The main purpose of the tunnel was to aid in

the discovery and removal ·Of minerals.
Counsel for defendants have mentioned only a few
of the "underground works" in the State of Utah which
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have •been and are sin1ilar to mining. In the early history of the State, and even today, a great many people
lived in dugouts. In the search for ·water they have burr·owed into the mountains to develop it. In its transportation they have excavated to make it available to
more fertile land and haYe excavated in the earth's surface to construct reservoirs for its preservation. In our
rugged country in the construction of railroads, highways, canals, and conduits they have made cuts, tunnels,
underpasses and .other excavations. In the construction
of buildings, houses, factories and shops foundations
have been laid sometime as deep as the height of the
structure. \Yells have been dug, sewers laid, and drainage systems constructed for the purpose of obtaining,
controlling ·and disposing of water. In 0ongested areas
practically all telephone, telegraph and other 0ables for
public utility service is handled by underground tunnelling and excavations. Last, and finally, an underground excavation about eight feet by five and approximately eight feet deep is made as the final resting abode
of the excavator. Some ·Of these underground structures
are large, some small, some long, some short, some in
hard rock where blasting and powder are necessary, and
in others it may be removed with pick and ·shovel. They
vary as greatly in character ·and purpose ·as the bills that
a certain collection agency used to· try to collect. Some
are long enough to require ventilation; others so short
that the daylight may enter whenever the sun shines.
Each and all of these activities comprehend within them
some of the features of mining-some more, some less.
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In each and ·all .of them, however, there was the great
distinguishing feature, namely, the purpose was not to
search for or extract minerals. This is a great difference because mining is an industry and, as stated by the
Missouri Supreme Court in State v. K entwell, 78 S. \V.
596,
''The operation of mines is a permanent business,
lasting frequently for many years. On the other
·hand the digging of a well or the running of a
tunnel is not to be classed as a business. It is
work that is to be completed in a comparatively
short time. Hence, there was absolutely no reason or necessity for including in the act those who
might in the construction of railroad or other
works incidentally be required to work beneath
the surface .of the earth.''
It seems to us that this argument IS amply answered by the cases cited by counsel for petitioners in
their brief.
Similarity of operations or similarity of conditions
has never been a ground for extending a statute beyond
its "fair import".
If this court were to announce as a new and novel
rule for statutory interpretations that statutes might
by implication be extended beyond their purview to subjects of similar kind or character, untold co•nfusion, uncertainty, injustice and damage would result. Railroad
laws would apply to automobiles, street ears and busses.
Labor laws would apply to capitalists, industrialists and
'' economi.c royalists''. The wife and housekeeper would
be subject to all the manufacturing, restaurant, hotel,
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boarding house and n1otor park laws, and might even
on accasion be subject to laws affecting public institutions. :Jlen and women who act childish would he subject to the disabilities of miners. The imagination, if
giYen to free play, becomes bewildered at the possibilities. In son1e cases the difference ,of character is
great 'but the similarity of oper·ation identical, and in
other cases it is the opposite. \Y e submit that certainty
in matters of statutory law is far greater to be desired
than the evil \Yhich would result from announcing such
a rule for interpretation of statutes, the result and effect
of which would be to open a flood gate of confusion. In
this connection we call the court's attention to the ease
of Gardner Baking Company v. Public Service Comm.issiou, (\Vis. 1937) 271 N. W. 833, wherein the Supreme
Court of that state refused to apply the provisions of
the Moto·r Vehicle Transportation Act fixing hours of
service for drivers of common carriers and contract carriers to drivers ;of private motor carriers. ·There, as
here, the contention was made that so far as the drivers
are concerned the ·situation was the same, but the court
said in effect, "if the legislature had so intended it would
have said so".
In this connection counsel for defendants make the
following argument on page six of their brief:
"Kumerous tunnels have been driven in the
mountains for purposes other than mining~ and
yet the question is raised in this c1ourt f.or the
first time. It i~s reasonable to suppose that the
whoFunding
made
these
tunnels
felt
that
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were amenable to the eight hour law and complied
with the san1e, otherwise it would seem that the
matter, long ago, would have been broug·ht bef,oTe the courts.''
Not s1o. The ·only f.air inferenee is that if, during the
past forty-four years, the exeeutive branch of the gov·ernment had attempted to apply this law to cases other
than mining, there would have been numerous cases before the court. The ·Only real inference is that when the
Holden case·s were decided interpreting the law as applying ·only t~o· those engaged in mi'ning that everyone
regarded that question as settled. No one should be
m·ore aware of the fact that the inference suggested by
counsel for defendants is not true than the defendant
State Metal Mine Inspector.
In this conne-ction there is a line of authorities to· the
effect that when an executive branch of the government
interprets the .statute or aceepts an interpretation of a
statute for a long period of time in a certain way that
that conduct itself may be taken into C!Onsideration in
construing the statute.
At page 12 of defendants' brief 1s the following
statement:
"vVe are ·only concerned in this matter as to
whether or not it applies to the tunnel in question,
but we feel tha.t it is no more applicable to tl1~
excavation for a house, or open sezcer, or am ord1na.ry well, any more than it would apply to an
open-cut in a quarry, or the large open-cuts being
made by the tlta.h Copper Compa;ny." (Italics
ours).
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We are at a loss to understand this statement unless it
means that an e:xcaYation for a house ·or ·open ,sewer or an
ordinary well are in the sanw class with reference to
this statute as an open cut quarry and the large Utah
Copper Company mine. The statement is ambiguous as
to whether it is counsel's contention that all are subject
to the statute or that they are not.
No matter what the intention of oounsel for defendant was, we submit that the reason why the undersigned as amicus ·Curiae have petitioned to he heard in
this case is because they are not, under the law, to be
pla!Ced in the same category .as either a quarry, the open
pit mine of Utah Copper Company, or the underground
mines of this state. We respectfully submit that the fair
import of the· statute in question does not place the construction industry in that category. The Utah Copper
Company and quarries may or may not be subject to the
law, but when counsel·sugge,sts that the builder of a house
or the digger of a sewer or of an ordinary well i's in the
same class with the Utah Copper Company in its open
pit operations they are in error. We are not representing the Copper Oompany. In the case of Byron v. Utah

Copper Company, 53 Utah 1'51, 178 Pac. 53, this court
held that the term "mining operations'' included the
open pit operations of the Utah Copper Company the
same as underground workings, and in the recent case of

Utah Copper Compa;ny v. Hays Estate, 83 Utah 545, 31
Pac. ( 2d) 624, this court held that the waste dump of the
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Utah Copper Company was ''a place for the reduction
or refining of ores or metals''.
Whether Utah Copper Company operations are
within the law is not in this 1c.ase. In view 10f the foregoing decisions certainly a ·substantial portion of their
operations are, but when counsel :states that ail excavating work is in the same class the only fair inference is
that they are contending that all such operations are
within the purview of the law. According to that construction the only thing that is neces·Bary to come within
t1he .statute is that a laborer be employed to dig any hole
in the ground for any purpose.
Non-mining operations in the excavati,on of sewers,
tunnels, wells, cuts, underpasses, foundations, conduits,
etc., are .and always have !been part of the operations of
the ·construction industry. Whether miners are employed
to perform a portion .of the work depends very largely
upon the extent and character of the operation. Sometimes blasting is done and ·sometimes not. As a general
rule ·such employment, if any, is temporary in character
to meet a particular situation. There are no stopes,
drifts, etc., as in a mine and, as before stated, if because
of similarity the Industrial Commis·sion feels that persons employed in those operations are liable to contract
pneumonia, miner's ·Cionsumption, silicosis, or any other
of the conditions enumerated by counsel for defendants,
or if there i~s any other condition which may be dangerous or injurious to the health of the l·aborers employed,
the Industrial Commission has ample power to so declare
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and specify the remedy, under the ·other pr-ovisions -of
the statute.
If the legislative branch of the g"O·vernment feels
that the present la\Y should be an1ended so as to broaden
its ·scope, that is t~he privilege of that branch of the government. \Ye may assume, however, that if and when
it doe·s so the enactment will cover ·only such porti!ons of
the construction industry as the legislature feels ~should
be covered. Tthey may desire to include only excavations
of a certain length or character. Or, again, they may feel
that such legislation ·should be limited to excavations
where blasting is done. Those are considerations for
the legislative branch .of the government. If and when
this law is extended beyond its present ~scope we may
assume that the representatives of the people in enaeting
tthe law will write the ·statute as they de~sire it. It is
no part -of the functions 10.f the executive branch of the
government or of the judicial branch to assume to exercise that function.
In the recent case of Nuttal v. Denver & Rio Grande
Railroad Comparny, 99 Pac. (2d) 15, this court was asked
to write a new rule .of law upon the doctrine of contributory negligence as a'Pplied to railroads. It was contended that the old rule is harsh, out-moded, and not
adapted to present day conditions. This court answered
that contention in the :Bollowing language:
''Finally, it is c-ontended that the rule of contributory negligence is harsh and .should now be
re~stricted and not be permitted to be interposed
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at all in negligence actions by way l()f defense to
any charged violation of express statutory en·actment. Tthe answer to this contention lies in
the fact that during the many years the pre·sent
rule has been ·enforced in this jurisdiction no
serious effort has been made to modify same in
the legislature.''
We respectfully submit that the same answer should
be given to defendants in this .case. If they desire a
change in the law the legi.slature is the place to seek it.
In conclusio·n may we state that the cases cited by
petitioners from Nevada, California, Missouri, Wyoming,
Colorado and the Federal District Court of Nevada construing statutes similar to this as not applying to construction work other than mining, are in line with our
own decisions in the Holden ·cases. Not one case is cited
by counsel for defendants to the contrary. In the face
of such uniformity of judicial .construction over such a
long period of time from. so many different jurisdictions,
it is difficult tn see 1h0\\' there could be any question as
to the meaning of the statute.
Respectfully ·submitted,

RicH, RICH &

STRONG,

and

J. BADGER,
Amicus Curiae.

CARLOS
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